We may be forgiven for asking the question,” What the devil were the Russians thinking?” given the fatal loss of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which resulted in the loss of territory it once controlled, the loss of hundreds of thousands of casualties, and its position as a pariah on the globe stage.
In The Russian Way of Deterrence: Strategic Culture, Coercion, and War, Dmitry Adamsky’s engaged and securely- argued precis on Soviet strategy, we can discern the emergence of the traditional, cultural, and social forces that have characterized Moscow’s defense doctrine for decades— and that seem to explain its behavior in Ukraine.
A Russophone teacher of approach and global connections in both Israel and Lithuania, Adamsky defines Russian punishment much more widely than its conventional European counterpart. In his telling — the results of painstaking research into Soviet military circulars, standard records, and other clear sources — it encompasses “employing threats, often accompanied by minimal use of force, to maintain the status quo, change it, shape the proper environment within which the interaction occurs, prevent escalation, or de- escalate”.
What makes the Russian approach unique is even more intriguing. ” The main argument of this book”, Adamsky proclaims, “is that cultural and ideational factors account for the peculiarities of the Russian approach”. Specifically, Russia’s strategic culture, military customs, intelligence traditions, and national mentality condition the country’s warfighting posture, which Adamsky colorfully labels “deterrence a la Russe“.
The key distinction between Western and Russian deterrence theories is etymological. Adamsky observes that the English term “deterrence” derives from “terror” or fear and “implies the infliction of apprehension to shape an adversary’s choices and actions”. By contrast, the Russian equivalent, sderzhivanie, connotes restraining or containing a person, a group, or a force straining to change the status quo. Accordingly, deterrence, to Russians, entails an action, specifically the” concrete engagement of the competitor”. ( The Russian language also boasts the word ustrashenie, or intimidation, which, like “deterrence”, derives from the word “terror”, but this term is used only in a negative sense when describing what Russia’s enemies seek to do to her. )
Then, too, Russian deterrence fundamentally entails a” cross- domain” approach that employs all available tools, including conventional, nonconventional, and subconventional military means, as well as diplomacy and information warfare. In terms of the latter, deterrence a la Russe combines these “forms of influence under one roof,” while Western strategists typically distinguish between cognitive- psychological tactics and digital- technological capabilities. Adamssky cites how Moscow used these strategies to navigate and shape the vicissitudes of inter-confessional conflict fomented by its ally, Syrian autocrat Bashar Assad, during the Russian engagement in Syria in the early 2010s.
So what explains these differences?
Pointing to cultural, ideational, and historical factors, Adamsky accentuates certain” systemic breakdowns” characteristic of Russian culture, such as recklessness, negligence, and carelessness, that have accounted for battlefield catastrophes. In addition, Moscow’s” culture of war tends to emphasize morale and psychological- cognitive factors over material- technological ones” to such an extent that it tends to deploy” a peculiar metaphysics about overcoming the enemy qualitatively, morally”. In the absence of a technological edge, Russians have typically pressed their advantage by emphasizing martial values of endurance, patience, and heroism.
In terms of ideology, Russia has historically relied on “reflexive control,” which Adamsky defines as” a complex of measures that forces the adversary to behave in a way that is both favorable to the initiator of the effort and appear benign to the target.” Reflexive control seeks to subtly and undetectably manipulate the adversary’s very sense of reality, a sort of Russian version of gaslighting. Its cousin, maskirovka, or military cunningness, incorporates “active measures”, or affirmative, generally clandestine, but nonviolent measures, to influence state actors to grave detriment, including by sowing discord among citizens.
And some traditional ideas persisted throughout the Russian and Soviet periods. These included “reasonable sufficiency,” or the smallest military investment that would allow the USSR to maintain rough parity with its Western rivals — the military equivalent of the term “minimally viable product” used in high-tech. Military and political leaders had to carefully calibrate resources for the purposes for which they served in order to get the most value for the ruble, which was in line with the typical Russian inferiority in materiel. The related idea of” correlation of forces and means” sought to ensure a balance of geopolitical power, similar to the Western “realist” school of international relations.
With this background, the logic of Putin’s ill- fated Ukrainian invasion begins to emerge.
First, Moscow believed, prior to the war, that its comprehensive” coercive signaling” across all platforms — informational, diplomatic, and military — would convey to the West, without firing a single shot, its determination to change the status quo among NATO, Ukraine, and Russia and reshape the post- Cold War order. But, of course, Putin miscalculated, badly.
” Moscow’s coercive signaling achieved the opposite results”, Adamsky writes. It “pushed Kyiv closer to Brussels and Washington,” NATO said,” as well as it prompted NATO to beef up its presence along Russian borders, conduct regular exercises on a scale unheard since the Cold War, and invest in countermeasure Russia all across its strategic periphery.”
Additionally, the emphasis that Moscow has placed on spiritual virtues like endurance and heroism, including what Adamsky refers to as” the traditional Russian glorification of “death on military duty,” provides insight into how Putin continues to recruit newcomers to the Donbass, despite the deaths of more than 100, 000 of them in the last two years alone.
In addition, the” systemic breakdowns” afflicting the implementation of Russian doctrine explains many of the signal failures in Ukraine.
Finally, these characteristics also shed light on Moscow’s nuclear saber- rattling during the conflict. Adamsky lays out the “nexus between the Orthodox Church and the nuclear forces” that is now common practiced in Russia. Putin has largely taken advantage of the former and combined it with the latter in an effort to impose traditional values and provide the ultimate threat.
Adamsky’s prose occasionally relies excessively on academic jargon and acronyms used by area experts but that are not widely understood by the average reader. A more in-depth analysis of the examples that abound in the rich and storied history of Russia would also help the book.
However, The Russian Way of Deterrence thoughtfully examines the thoughts, desires, and souls of Russian military strategists and offers somber counsel for those who would follow them.
Michael M. Rosen is an adjunct fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and an attorney and writer in Israel. Reach him at [email protected].
