” Politics”, they say, “ain’t beanbag”. In other words, it’s not just a sport. There is a lot of disagreement about our political views, which is why many modern-day descriptions of American politics begin with this assessment. And this debate is characterized as being extremely fractious, divided, and widespread. Family obtain- togethers turn nasty over social arguments. Relationships end, or do n’t ever begin, because of political differences. Red says and blue state, or, more precisely, the more remote and more urban parts of every position, see themselves as fundamentally at odds. Of course, our officials are part of this, to. Their strategies are renowned for their unwavering anger, and they frequently act as an improvement of those campaigns rather than the reverse.
Additionally, results in American politics are explained based on assessments of gaps in how we formulate our political views, such as votes won or lost, costs passed or failed, and precedent upheld or overturned by authorities. Citizens may be described as being affected by other facts, fake news, propaganda, or crime theories, depending on who’s doing the describing. Due to our current media consumption or usage patterns, we might have misled the experts or ended up in echo chambers. We might be treating politics like tribal warfare, where getting the facts right is not the point, or where some beliefs are viewed as being beyond the scope of reason and questioning them as heresy. Perhaps an ideology has us in its purview as a result of our evolution. Or we might be clinging on to the edges of a complex world that is too trivial for our silly little minds.

In my new book Political Beliefs, I try to approach these issues by asking four questions. First, what is a political belief to begin with? Second, how do people form their political beliefs? Third, how should people form their political beliefs? Fourth, what significant events in American life have an impact on our political outlooks?
Some of our beliefs have obvious political consequences. If we believe a candidate is corrupt, we’ll likely vote for the other one. When a policy is brought up in conversation, we’ll likely back candidates who oppose it and argue against it. In my view, lots of beliefs about politics are n’t political and lots of political beliefs are n’t about politics. My belief that there are nine justices on the Supreme Court is n’t a political belief, even though it’s about politics. However, my opinions on issues like gun violence rates, the validity of conventional economic theory, or even the details of an altercation that has become controversial have political roots. That’s because they’re controversial in a way that relates to politics.
Our opinions about such controversies tend to cluster, which is one of the most important political facts in the country. This is certainly true of our beliefs about public policy: If you know what someone thinks about taxes, you can predict with some reliability what he or she thinks about immigration, gun control, abortion, and so on. But it’s also true of the other sorts of political beliefs, the ones that are n’t about politics. What a person thinks about the personal lives and motivations of politicians, what he or she believes happened in the media, what he or she believes the value of a university degree is, and so on.

And that’s not all. Political beliefs are increasingly closely related to things like where you live, what car you drive, where you buy coffee, and what television shows you watch. Political saturation is a current occurrence, according to Vanderbilt University philosopher Robert Talisse.
How did we get politically saturated? According to one theory, our political beliefs derive from a sense of belonging, identity, or purpose in a social group. We take on beliefs because they fit with who we take ourselves to be — whether we are red, blue, or something different, radical, moderate, or in between, and so on. If this is accurate, choosing a car or cafe, for instance, is likely the result of our other pseudo-political activities.
This explanation fits nicely with a sophisticated understanding of polarization, one of the most significant political phenomena in the United States. According to what we know, polarization is most often caused by the growing clustering of various beliefs and activities. People who have beliefs and activities that do n’t align with their group’s identity are easier to “kick out” because of how clustered they are. Our political beliefs are also made more morally easy by clustering. We and them eventually start to appear to be the only two kinds of people in the world at some point.
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These clusters begin to disintegrate when we consider our political beliefs from the perspective of reason. Many of these political issues are unrelated in any way. What kind of coincidence would be necessary for the other” side” to make all the errors? Maybe I should reconsider my beliefs if I reflect on them and discover that they are exactly what an outsider would expect a person like me to have.
After the telling of this portion of the story, there is still a lot to be said and questions about political beliefs. Why did politics recently play such a significant part in our identities? What did it replace? What might eventually replace politics? Is it harmful for politics to be present in our lives? Does it increase civic engagement or just increase interpersonal conflict? Can we shift our political irrationality toward rational investigations, or do these kinds of underpinnings doom us to do the opposite? Regardless of our responses to these questions, I hope that having a critical analysis of our political beliefs will help us consider both what politics gets from us and what we do n’t. We should be careful not to treat our political processes and institutions like beanbags because they are crucial.
In the John and Daria Barry postdoctoral research fellowship at Princeton University’s Department of Politics ‘ James Madison Program on American Ideals and Institutions.  ,