In response to the charge of defrauding the United States government over the deadly 737 MAX 8 crashes in 2018-2019, Boeing and the Department of Justice ( DOJ) reached a guilty plea and an additional$ 24 million fine, according to The Epoch Times on July 8. The Alaska Air door event in January 2024 constituted a protection infraction of Boeing’s unique “deferred trial” arrangement of 2021. If U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor approves the currently proposed plea bargain and great, Boeing could prevent a criminal trial as a result of this situation.
But, Judge O’Connor could choose to accept the petition package and send it back for more conversations. In theory, a criminal trial may follow from more plea deal discussions.
The MAX 8 crash victims ‘ families “pushed for a criminal trial to potentially reveal what Boeing insiders could have known” about the underlying issues, according to The Epoch Times. This is an essential point. The MAX crashes ‘ underlying causes and full context were not addressed in the DOJ’s 2021 lawsuit against Boeing. A last option for further analysis and enforcement of justice is provided by the reopening of this case.
Instead of focusing on Boeing’s failure to disclose details about the disastrous Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS ) control system within the 737 MAX design, the DOJ’s charge of fraudulent activity was focused primarily on the circumstances surrounding its development. As well, the cost called out” two … Flight Technical Pilots” (test professionals with flying practice ) as the cause of responsible for the false lack of transparency.
All of this sounds questionable and alarming because I’ve worked on several large programs for the military and the Federal Aviation Administration ( FAA ) myself.
A lineup, next-generation plane model does n’t casually feature an independently operated computer system like MCAS. There should n’t be a need for it. The correct integration of automation is a cautious, thorough approach taken by the aircraft and defense engineering community. MCAS was added as a high-tech Band-Aid at the conclusion to address a troubling problem with the actual MAX design in contrast to this careful view.
Without space for the new engine in the original mounting location, the MAX engineering team had to figure out how to retrofit a massive, next-generation engine ( with fuel efficiency comparable to the Airbus A320neo ) onto a legacy 737 aircraft from 1968 due to incompatible requirements. To fit the larger engine, the group moved the engine mounting site forth and higher. This plane style has an problematic, more advanced inclination to pitch forward, which may cause a stall in extreme circumstances, according to an analysis of the new mounting location.
The crew rather turned to the executive potion of technology to explore alternative structural design choices, such as redesigning the landing gear. Tragically, in the 2018-2019 crashes, sound engineering was outsourced to an autonomous MCAS computer with the authority to push the plane downward as it saw fit.
An engineering team would not choose to take this course of action of its own accord. The old airframe had issues, and the new mounting location had issues. It is impossible to imagine how automation could be used to resolve these issues. A further investigation through a criminal trial should be conducted to determine whether a trade study ( the engineering team’s comparative review of design options — a best practice ) was carried out, and if so, who made the decision.
Boeing leadership had ( as is always the case ) set the high-level strategic “ground rules” from the outset of the program. These limitations are reflected in an unearthed slide from a MAX preliminary design review ( PDR) presentation.
The PDR presentation would have been prepared, presented, and confirmed by Boeing executives at the 737 MAX program manager or technical director level. PDR is the most important review of a system’s development. It sets the doctrine. Contributors-level engineers have no choice but to deviate from what has been memorialized on PDR slides, regardless of whether the system’s design or its communication about it. It’s just not done, the integrity of a program is set by its leadership, and the engineers are to follow.
As it turns out, the DOJ personally indicted the more senior of the two Boeing flight technical pilots in the DOJ charge against Boeing in October 2021 for promoting Boeing’s official, deceitful plan. An internal communication the prosecution used against him unexpectedly established his innocence. The technical pilot was discharged in March 2022. A jury of 12 rejected Boeing’s scapegoat attempt.
Boeing is guilty of fraudulent behavior. The root cause is not, however, MCAS or individual engineer communications. The 737 MAX competitive strategy fundamentals should be known to the grieving families and the general public, and they deserve to see that party brought to justice.
Vanessa Battaglia is a defense engineer with experience designing software, hardware, and airborne systems for the Army, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, Special Operations Command, and the Federal Aviation Administration.
