The , U. S. Army , has reprimanded several of those in the , Lewiston , shooter’s chain of command for “dereliction of work” after a series of administrative problems, but prosecutors say they also may suggest why the man was released from a psychiatric doctor next summer.
The long-awaited statement from the Army’s internal research into its management of , Robert Card, a military from , Bowdoin , who went on to remove 18 people in , Lewiston , next October, was ultimately released to the public Tuesday.
But while the report shows mistakes made by Army event managers and Card’s commanders, three of whom have been disciplined, it does not reveal why the man was released from a , New York , doctor past August despite displaying anxiety, illness and violent thinking.
His discharge occurred just one day after Card’s request to leave, which was delayed until the hearing was canceled.
The Army investigator stated numerous times in the report that hospital staff had refused to cooperate with the investigation, and that they still do n’t understand that decision. The Army is now requesting additional federal offices to look into Four Winds and determine whether it is upholding the highest standard of care.
” This investigation identified multiple errors made by unit leadership, medical professionals and local law enforcement”, the report reads. I suggest making systemic adjustments and holding unit leaders accountable to improve future oversight and care for Army Reserve soldiers.
The report also reveals a series of attempts the Army made to reach Card in the days before the shooting, as late as , Oct. 24, in order to complete his behavioral health profile. Card picked up the phone that day, but he quickly hung up.
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The Army launched its probe into the handling of the reservist days after the , Oct. 25 , shooting. Details about the case slowly surfaced during hearings held by the Maine commission investigating the shooting while the small team of investigators worked behind closed doors.
The investigation into Tuesday’s report is one of several that are scheduled to conclude in the coming weeks. The Army Inspector General also published her own evaluation of the independent Army report Tuesday, saying Card is” singularly responsible” for the mass shooting, and the , Maine , commission is expected to release its final report later this summer.
‘ LAST, BEST CHANCE ‘
Much of the Army’s 115-page report retreads familiar pieces of the timeline of the shooter’s declining mental health, from the first reports of paranoia last January to his aggression and hospitalization that July to his threats against his unit ‘s , Saco , base in September. However, the document makes fresh conclusions about the errors that led to the shooting, with only a small portion of which being attributable to Army policies and practices.
According to investigators, the reservist’s commanders neglected to submit incident reports and other paperwork at various times. Additionally, they misinterpreted the medical records obtained from Four Winds Psychiatric Hospital as being protected by a military exemption from HIPPA.
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According to the report, the civilian case managers responsible for monitoring the reservist’s care did n’t carefully review his medical records when he refused to take any further care, so they closed his file at the end of August in accordance with the flawed ( and since changed ) policy of the Army’s Psychological Health Program.
The report also calls for several changes to Army policy, including that those employed by the psychological health program must report to the commander whenever they are unable to contact the soldier, as well as training methods and discipline for the three unnamed soldiers, who face potential dismissal or even discharge as a result.
The report claims that hospital staff who are not affiliated with the Army shift responsibility for the “questionable” decision to release the reservist from the hospital last year.
The investigator appears to suggest that the brain damage he was exhibiting during his paranoid behavior may have been the result of a bad fall from a ladder in 2008 rather than the hand grenade training he led during his 20 years with the Army.
And they discovered that the Sagadahoc County Sheriff’s Office, the agency that ultimately held the ultimate responsibility for stopping the shooting, was the one that failed to confront the reservist directly after he threatened to do so last September.
” I find ( Sagadahoc ) had the last, best, chance of impacting SFC Card’s actions”, the report reads. Because the Army lacked jurisdiction and authority over SFC Card in his civilian capacity, “any reliance on the military to handle this matter was also unreasonable.”
ADMINISTRATIVE ERRORS
His commanders appeared to have abandoned all of his commands as early as May 2023, when local police began to voice concerns about Card’s aggression and paranoia, such as holding meetings to discuss his mental health at the unit’s May drill weekend.
Prior to the unit’s annual training mission to , New York  in July, the Army’s investigation discovered that commanders were aware of numerous reports of the reservist’s strange behavior but did not believe the incidents required placing him on active orders to get medical attention.
One commander claimed that Card’s mental health issues did not “adevex his military job” and that he should not have prevented him from leaving the mission to , New York, where he would assist in running a machine gun range for West Point cadets.
Although public hearings have revealed that Capt.  , Jeremy Reamer , and Sgt. Redactions in the Army report make it impossible to know who exactly is being interviewed or referenced in any particular section because  , Kelvin Mote , were the two soldiers who most directly responded to the growing concerns.
The reservist tried to fight a fellow soldier who he mistakenly believed was insulting him, but the administration responded in disapproval with his efforts.
After being quickly moved from Keller Army Community Hospital to Four Winds for a more thorough psychological evaluation and treatment and before being abruptly released on August 3, his commanders should have conducted a “line of duty investigation” — the process of determining and documenting whether the reservist’s service aggravated his health issues and thus entitled him to benefits.
Following his discharge from Four Winds, the commanders should have extended his active duty orders and sent him to Keller for a medical evaluation board, according to the report.
Instead, he was given the option of driving home with a friend and departing the hospital without much, if any, discharge instructions.
According to investigators, local law enforcement had the best chance of stopping the shooting because of the Army’s limited authority over reservists, even if the commanders had done everything right.
Like Mote and Reamer, who testified before the commission investigating the shooting, the Army report concluded that deputies should have been able to use , Maine ‘s , yellow flag law to confiscate the reservist’s weapons — a claim deputy , Aaron Skolfield , has fiercely disputed.
The deputy’s dismissal is in particular dispute with Skolfield, who has claimed that Reamer and Mote downplayed the threats Card made.
According to the report,” They wrote that they were going to, essentially, ignore a letter from a coworker who provided information about an eye-witness account of a threat to commit a mass shooting.”
DISCHARGE DILEMMA
Recent commission meetings have shown how a tangled web of contracted medical providers, Army programs, and privacy laws have made it difficult for investigators to ascertain exactly what transpired during the reservist’s hospitalization in , New York , last summer.
Tuesday’s release raised new questions about Four Winds ‘ relationship with the Army, but offered few answers.
On , June 26, Card underwent psychological testing at Four Winds. He had poor emotional control and an “inconsistent coping style,” according to experts who found him to be less predictable than most people. They concluded that his lifetime risk of violence “may be slightly higher than most people” and “may increase sharply at times when he is paranoid and emotionally overwrought”
On , July 27, 11 , days after commanders first ordered Card to go to the hospital, the soldier asked staff at Four Winds to release him, according to the report. Doctors did not believe he was ready to be released and took steps to involuntarily commit him under , New York State , law. A hearing was scheduled for , Aug. 2.
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The reservist then rescinded his request. But for some reason, the hospital changed tack and released him on , Aug. 3 , without a court hearing.
Hospital staff informed investigators that they were unable to legally respond to inquiries as to why they had decided to release him because they had not received a court order or a waiver from the reservist’s estate.
” We do n’t have the authority to compel them to participate”, Lt. Gen.  , Jody Daniels, the head of the Army Reserves, told reporters on Monday. Daniels claimed she was unable to respond to inquiries about the exact nature of the Army’s relationship with Four Winds.
After the reservist’s discharge, several parties that should have been tracking his case failed to adequately share information with one another, according to report.
According to the report,” It appears that Four Winds ‘ discharge of SFC Card failed to provide adequate follow-up care or medication management.” ” Four Winds believed ( Keller ) would follow up. ( Keller ) was not tracking SFC Card’s care because he was not on orders for more than 30 days. As a result, no one adequately followed up on SFC Card’s discharge care”.
According to the report, he had been prescribed the anti-psychotic Olanzapine, but shortly after his release he informed friends and an Army case manager that he had stopped taking the drug because he did n’t like how it made him feel. He hardly ever answered the phone when case managers called and never made appointments for therapy.
According to the report, there is proof Four Winds should not have let the reservist, who was refusing to receive medication or treatment, go. But rather than make a definitive conclusion, investigators have asked the , Department of Forensic Psychology , at the , Walker Reed National Military Medical Center , to analyze whether Four Winds met the established standard of care. Additionally, the hospital will perform a forensic autopsy.
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( c ) 2024 the Portland Press Herald
Distributed by , Tribune Content Agency, LLC.
