The U. S. Navy is n’t just for fighting overseas or protecting the homeland. It’s even a standard tool of power projection, diplomacy, and protecting and regulating global trade. However, today’s Navy is very small to meet the demands. As a result, traditional Navy things, such as enforcing punishment, are way down the priority list. However, if we had the guts to re-establish privateers, this capability gap might get filled.
During the long response to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and the delusion of the peaceful rise of the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ), the U. S. Navy was allowed to atrophy. One observable consequence is that, according to reports, America does n’t have any aircraft carriers currently operating in the Middle East, which are all in various stages of training or repair.  ,
Navies are n’t cheap. The PRC seems to be building tens of warships very fast, and the U.S. defense industry base needs billions before even beginning to ramp up manufacturing. Current ships take a long time to develop. Our Navy will be too little for at least ten years, therefore.
Using Pirates to Combat Russia’s Ghost Fleet
Financial war has become a key component of international relations, but it is frequently overused and ineffective unless carefully enforced. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the United States and its allies imposed sanctions on Russia’s fuel imports. To get around those restrictions, Russia operates a spirit ship of fuel tankers. Without classic coverage and with obscuring ownership, these aging tankers sail.  ,
In February, the U. S. blacklisted 14 Russian ships operated by Sovcomflot, a state-run transport business. There is no evidence of any ship being impounded, so it does n’t seem like the blacklisting has had any real impact. But declaring restrictions and then not carefully enforcing them erodes U. S. reliability — and, with it, deterrent.
196 crude oil tankers reportedly left Russian ports solely in December, with the majority of the ships flying Panama, Gabon, and Liberia flags of comfort. Russian warships frequently accompany the ships as they approach German powers, but they “go dark” as they connect with additional vessels to transfer the oil to or handle it in ports where the rule of law is a little weakly adhered to.  ,
If the U. S. really wants to shut down Russia’s spirit ship, it may consider an aged but powerful tool: pirates. Bringing up pirates, sanctioned under the U. S. Constitution, to pin the Russian spirit ship can boost national stability while the U. S. ship is rebuilt. This technique, grounded in traditional law and legal platform, would strengthen U. S. proper flexibility, especially if paired with a policy that promoted British energy dominance.
Traditional and Constitutional Context of Privateering
A rich and varied history surrounds buccaneering. Countries in Europe issued letters of marque to complement their naval forces around 500 years before. The tactic successfully outsourced naval warfare to private individuals and ships to seize enemy vessels and cargo.  ,
Privateers significantly affected American history, particularly during the American Revolution and the 1812 War, when they hacked British supply lines and won valuable prizes. Privateers were last used by the United States in the Civil War during the Confederacy in 1812, but they were never used again.  ,
The prohibition of privateering waned in the middle of the 19th century, largely as a result of the Declaration of Paris in 1856, which was signed by the major European powers and later other countries. However, the U. S. did not ratify the treaty. Of note, America saw its small Navy, relative to the European powers, as a reason to keep its options open.  ,
The U.S. Constitution explicitly grants Congress the authority to issue marque and reprisal letters ( Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 ), giving privateering a legal foundation. This concept remains an option under U. S. law.  ,
Private military contractors are well-suited to carry out privateering missions. Traditional military operations are supported by the private sector’s agility and operational skills. If privateers had the legal authority to seize vessels while violating sanctions, they could keep the seized goods and sell the contraband oil. This funding would help to attract highly skilled operators and increase the effectiveness of law enforcement.
Incentivizing U. S. Flagged Shipping
Engaging privateers to target the Russian ghost fleet might have a second-effect of encouraging international shippers to fly under the U.S. flag. These businesses would benefit significantly from the possibility of the U.S. Navy’s defense against potential retaliation from Russia or other adversarial allies. Currently, U. S. flagged vessels are entitled to the protection of the U. S. Navy, providing a security assurance that can be crucial in unstable maritime environments.  ,
This shift could bolster the U. S. merchant marine fleet, enhance national security, and ensure better compliance with international laws and sanctions. Additionally, a larger fleet carrying U.S. flags would expand the organization’s robust logistical network, which is absolutely essential for deterring the PRC from the Pacific’s vast expanse.  ,
Energy Dominance and Economic Stability
If America wants to control global market fluctuations in terms of fuel prices and inflation, energy dominance is essential. Energy would be the mainstay of the Russian ghost fleet’s strategic deployment of privateers. In the absence of a new supply, the international price of oil would likely rise. The gap might be filled by American energy dominance, which would stabilize crude oil prices and markets.  ,
The recent depletion of the U. S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve ( SPR ) under the Biden administration, aimed at tempering fuel prices ahead of the 2022 midterm elections, underscores the need for a robust energy strategy. A cost-effective refill of the SPR would be achieved thanks to energy dominance.  ,
Beyond domestic economic stability, America has a dominant position in terms of energy. Moscow has long relied on Russian energy as a means of influence. By curbing the ghost fleet’s operations and enhancing U. S. energy exports, the U. S. can undermine this leverage — a critical factor in geopolitical dynamics— as well as strengthen energy ties with allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
The reintroduction of privateers, authorized under the U. S. Constitution, offers a solution to a costly problem that wo n’t soon be solved: a U. S. Navy that lacks the power to meet its commitments.
