The astounding stupidity of state officials at every stage, from condition leaders to local regulators, has been exposed by the Los Angeles wildfires. For the past year, we’ve been exposing the blatant misconduct and fraud that contributed to this crisis and worsened it. The disclosures keep coming, each one highlighting fresh ways in which officers failed to protect the lives and property of those who trusted them to behave appropriately.
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The Los Angeles Times ‘ most recent revelation reveals that despite warnings of dangerous fire conditions, the LAFD prioritized various areas like Hollywood and the San Fernando Valley, leaving the Palisades underprepared for the looming catastrophe.  ,
Top leaders decided not to dispatch almost 1, 000 firefighters and dozens of water-carrying engines for an emergency implementation in advance of the fire, which burned much of the Pacific Palisades and continues to burn, according to interviews and domestic LAFD records.
According to the information obtained by The Times and interviews with former LAFD chiefs and former city officials with knowledge of city operations, fire officials decided to decline to get the firefighters to work for a second shift next Tuesday because the winds were building, which would have doubled the number of engines available to help with wildfire fighting.
After the Walls fire was completely out of control, the department simply began calling up further firefighters and deploying those extra engines.
No additional machines had been placed in the Palisades, where the blaze broke out about 10: 30 a. m. on Jan. 7, authorities said. The department had planned nine vehicles to be on duty in Hollywood and the San Fernando Valley in anticipation of fires to start it. More engines” first thing in the morning,” according to officials, will be installed to even cover east L.A.
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According to a statement, LAFD Chief Kristin Crowley had issued a grave warning about serious staffing shortages and teaching spaces within the department, but L. A. did not. Apparently, the management of president Karen Bass ignored or perhaps suppressed her fears. In a letter Crowley sent to town fire commissioners, it was stated that the department had about half the rescuers it needed, and staffing levels had remained constant since the 1960s despite considerable people growth. With 61 % of firefighters failing to meet the national four-minute standard in 2022, the shortage caused longer response times.
Related: View: Biden and Harris Insult Wildfire Victims During Fatal Lecture
Crowley furthermore highlighted the district’s limited firefighter-to-resident amount, far below the recommended requirements for a city of Los Angeles’s dimension. Mayor Bass approved a$ 17 million money cut despite her ask for a budget boost to address these issues.  ,
Of course, Crowley has even mismanaged interests, focusing more on DEI activities than on addressing the district’s glaring planning deficiencies. Then she’s on security again.
Chief Fire Chief Kristin Crowley defended the decisions made by her organization, arguing that leaders should use tactical planning and limited resources to continue handling typical 911 calls. She said the number of enquiries doubled Tuesday from a normal day, to 3, 000 at the LAFD’s 106 fire facilities, as the great gusts downed trees and power lines.
” The program that they put up, I stand behind, because we have to handle everybody in the city”, Crowley told The Times.
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A possible cover-up of the information appears to be unfolding. Crowley and other officials have recently contradictory accounts about how many engines were really present to support program deployments in the Los Angeles Times. However, according to the Times, an inner planning record reveals that the department made the decision to not install nine further “ready stockpile” engines to fire-prone areas. These vehicles were distinct from the nine that had been set up in Hollywood and the San Fernando Valley.
Former LAFD leaders claim that if the office had used tried-and-true methods, the department may have slowed the recent fires ‘ devastating effects.
However, some former rulers with extensive experience with LAFD techniques claimed that the majority of the more than 40 machines could have been deployed pre-deployed to fire areas before the Palisades blaze started, while others were kept station to assist with the rise in 911 calls. According to recent LAFD officials, those engines were later used to battle the Palisades fireplace and additional blazes or to replace them with those that were deployed to the front line.
 , What a disaster.
