While some may be afraid of the newest aircraft security problems and accidents, experts say that the recent tragedies and near-misses do not come as a surprise to experienced professionals. The single query is: Why did it take so long?
There are numerous health problems in the aircraft industry. United Airlines B777 plunged to the Pacific during a climb in 2023, and the Federal Aviation Administration ( FAA ), United, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB ) didn’t conduct an investigation for months. A B777’s 265-pound key rubber fell from over 200 feet and was still spinning into an aircraft parking lot when it took off from Los Angeles. The head shoe came off a B757 taxi. When an improperly pressurized wheel exploded in Atlanta, two concepts were killed. The most notable events occurred in Toronto, a PSA Airlines local planes and a military helicopter collided in midair, and an Endeavour local aircraft struck a aircraft during a go-around at La Guardia airport. More recent occurrences have never been covered in the media or were unavoidable.
On several fronts, Boeing’s 737-Max failed. However, as some persons were led to believe, Boeing wasn’t the loss. Boeing produces goods. For technological advancements, airlines purchase these plane. The airline is only responsible for correctly training its planes and professionals to operate and maintain the plane, not the company’s.
Boeing’s problem was the Alaska Airlines flight 1282 entrance plug loss, but the company wasn’t the only one. The FAA, Spirit AeroSystems, the lease aircraft producer, and the NTSB were among the parties to blame for that failure. All of the crucial indicators were missed. They allowed defects in quality control, allowed internal and external quality checks to be ignored, and nearly nearly cost a helicopter full of people their lives. Alaska trip 1282 was not recognized as what it was: a symptom despite the fact that it was impossible to analyze these numerous facts in such a small space.
Why are Safety Failures Growing?
Second, the events unfolding occur on the day after Covid-19 closures. Many members of the FAA aviation safety inspector ( ASI) workforce stayed at home when former president Joe Biden introduced telework policies. FAA-certificate holders, including global repair stations and reform facilities, were prevented from conducting on-site surveillance and supervision. Since 2020, the United States has been deaf to the activities of some FAA certificate holders, including several air operators.
Next, there was a large exodus of experienced ASIs who resisted the Covid shot. The mandate even was revoked by flights and their commitment partners.
Third, many “diversity, equity, and inclusion” ( DEI ) hires, in both government and industry, further decreased the level of industry experience of many. By concentrating on “racist highways” and La promotions, Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg ignored true safety concerns. Because of Buttigieg’s distractions, philosophy took a backseat to safety.
The journey to security failure has been years in the making, and issues that were hidden in plain sight have evolved into nightmares of industry’s unique creation.
Root Factors
Confidence wasn’t the cause of the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines B737-Max incidents, though it did enjoy a significant part. The most crucial role in the security issues was played by the bean counters at Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines.
Poor knowledge don’t come from manufacturers giving their customers instruction; instead, they come from a growing overdependence on technology. Where do beans bars fit into? To make the most of the cost-savings promises that fresh high-tech plane, like the Boeing B737-Max, are investing in. Bean counters anticipate aircraft and technicians to dismiss honing their skills and rather allow the aircraft to fly or repair itself. In addition, fresh plane technologies will continue to evolve as may future developments, such as one- or zero-pilot cockpits.
Every aspect of an aircraft’s trip report, from flight power settings to engine power adjustments, is intended to have the lowest gasoline consumption. Current aircraft are also designed to be fuel-efficient. The only restriction is that pilots must remain hands-off. The trip system is used by today’s pilot to program the flight computer and plot the altitude, speed, and course. The captain sits back and babysits while the captain retracts/extends the equipment and flaps during flight or landing. Because the aircraft’s laptop flies more financially than the individual pilot, airlines press pilots to surrender control of the aircraft. Aircraft become careless even though the outcomes are lower energy consumption and lower fees. Their ability ages, and their expertise deteriorate.
Professionals have other restrictions. Diagnostics abilities are discouraged. The airline administration wants the technician to know what to correct. Knowledge that were well known centuries ago are no longer so prevalent, especially as fly-by-wire systems are being developed. The traditional methods are forgotten, and they will never be passed down to the next generation.
Equally crucial, self-evaluations of health and regulatory bodies are compromised. The FAA is scrambling to coach new-hire ASIs as it is still reeling from history ASI departures. Their level of experience has decreased, so it will get incoming ASIs decades to advance their FAA career knowledge to levels pre-2020. The last FAA members will never be able to impart years of expertise before retiring. All this while the FAA even encounters difficulties with autonomous and jet aircraft.
In the interim, the NTSB, who are merely speculative vehicles detectives, is today demonstrating a fundamental lack of business knowledge. Investigative procedures are being discarded. Since the NTSB was founded in 1967, whether it is due to ignorance or a general lack of experience, it has not yet produced an incident report that has improved health. It’s unclear how the aircraft industry is hope the NTSB to know and help aviation safety based on the NTSB’s questionable authority.
Travelers are afraid, and they are asking themselves,” Is it safe?” We have an airline business that believes DEI triumphs over experience and knowledge, a controller who believes it can control such an economy with inspectors who have significantly decreased skills, an investigation agency that doesn’t get accidents really, and a media that doesn’t accurately record what’s happening.
Sean Duffy, the minister of vehicles, has a lot to do. He has significant issues with the NTSB and FAA’s team quality. He will have to consider the problems facing these organizations and put his trust in the lower-level officials responsible for supervision, evaluation, and surveillance. Why? administrators and upper-management were the first to destroy these organizations.
Stephen Carbone has worked in the aviation sector for 40 years, with the carriers for 19 times. Before founding his own consulting firm, Aircraft Maintenance Safety Professionals, he retired in 2022 after 20 times as an FAA examiner and NTSB significant injury analyst.
