Some proponents of election integrity firmly believe that election machines are the source of election security. Others try to steer clear of” conspiracy” labels, so they shy away from complicated machine issues altogether.
When approaching allegations of disturbance or consistent errors, the dependability of voting equipment cannot be ignored in an effort to move the middle, not when the goal is to boost voter confidence. Fortunately, there are a variety of practical ways device suspicion can and should be addressed.
Both parties have voiced concerns about models at various times prior to 2020, including in 2019, when Democrats loudly urged for the section of the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act.
Nothing could be more evident from the plaintiff testimonies in a new Georgia situation, Curling v. Raffensperger, that this distrust continues today and immediately affects voting behavior. Clearly, distrust in America’s voting machines has n’t gone away, it only bounces back and forth across party lines and must be dealt with. However, it’s simpler to say than to do.
Luckily, functional solutions do occur. However, you might not believe the people who are best suited to make these shifts. Local local organizations may be best suited to market real changes on a state level, as many have already done. Local election authorities should consider organizing and lobbying their local election authorities about the following. Locals may be surprised by how reliable systems are.
Palm- Marked Votes
One way to boost voter confidence is to switch away from BMDs ( ballot marking devices ) to hand-numbered paper ballots without losing sight of the ease and speed of electronic ballot scanners. With BMDs, a voting methods into the ballot hall, makes a choice, and the system produces a vote with a QR script, which is eventually scanned to quantify votes.
The issue is that you ca n’t tell what a QR code means unless you scan it. Although the system also produces accessible word, the readable text is not used to quantify the results, and in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, a machine error caused the readable text and QR codes never to meet. The issue is that the readable text may reveal the citizen’s ballot, but the QR code, which is basically used to collate results, does not.
By eliminating the QR script and building a more trustworthy paper trail, hand-marked vote may resolve that problem. As yet Kamala Harris after said,” Paper votes are the smartest, safest way to ensure your voting is safe”. Additionally, adopting hand-marked ballots would n’t require more staff because scanning software allows users to count votes using readable text rather than QR codes.
State or counties frequently have to pay for additional program, which can be expensive, to counteract this change. In states where voting systems is decided at the county level rather than the state level, overcoming that challenge may be easier.
When supplier contracts expire, there may be an option to change or improve in regions where voting technology is rented from vendors. By requesting access to open records, obtaining the county’s contract, and making recommendations for technology changes at the ideal time, local grassroots can become effective advocates.
Hand Counts
In some small, select counties, hand counts on Election Day are a viable alternative to horse-and-buggy days, contrary to what Rachel Maddow has suggested. This approach, which completely removes voting machines from the equation, would undoubtedly increase voter confidence if machine reliability is a county’s top concern.
However, hand counts can be a hard sell and come with their own set of challenges. Although hand counting avoids the expense of using voting machines, it requires more staff members to perform the actual counting of thousands of votes. Hand counts can take a lot of time and raise the possibility of human error or malfeasance, despite the use of some strategic methods of counting. Hand counts ‘ errors are likely to be more rare than a common machine problem, so it should be taken into account that there could still be significant errors.
Overall, transitioning from voting machines to hand counting is not a practical or achievable solution in every county, but in a small county with robust advocacy, it may be possible.
Hand Recounts
Hand recounts are a much more effective way to audit machines and increase voter confidence in counties where practice and technology are less widely used. These are frequently referred to as traditional post-election audits. A fixed percentage of the vote’s countdown must already be conducted by hand, according to many states. Employing a hand recount increases the chances of finding the issue if there is a discrepancy between the way that machines tabulate the votes and the actual results.
Local governments should consult county officials to make sure that the hand recount requirements are being followed if a state already has one. Requesting a partial hand recount from county election boards may still be a more realistic compromise than supporting new software or full hand recounts, while still providing some assurance that the machines have worked properly.
Logic and Accuracy Testing
Before Election Day, voting machines are subject to a process known as Logic and Accuracy Testing, and almost every state implements this process. There are numerous recommendations made by the Election Administration Commission regarding the proper course of action for calculating logic and accuracy testing, but there is good reason to believe that many counties do n’t adhere to the recommendations. A significant machine malfunction in Northampton, Pennsylvania, where the machines produced flipped votes, could have been avoided with proper and thorough testing of logic and accuracy.
Most states also allow public observation of logic and accuracy testing, and to ensure the testing is occurring, locals should attend. Grassroots organizations may also be able to request that election officials alter certain parameters to ensure that the testing is as accurate and thorough as possible.
Hash Testing
Lastly, there is a type of testing called hash testing, which the U. S. Election Assistance Commission recommends. Hash values are included in each machine to act as a digital fingerprint. Comparing the machine’s hash value to the software’s hash value as originally certified is a common method for confirming the software’s integrity.
If there are differences, it may indicate that the machine has been compromised. Local grassroots candidates with the most technological know-how may be best suited to ask their local election officials to conduct hash code testing of voting machines. Perhaps grassroots members should campaign for testing of at least some voting machines if it is impossible to complete all voting machines.
Grassroots Efforts Can Improve Machine Skepticism
Most county election officials have some sort of influence on the results of elections. County election security and transparency measures can vary, sometimes very much, because of this. Some counties use more thorough logic and accuracy testing, others are more open to cleaning voter rolls, and others have the ability to choose what kind of election equipment to use if they meet certain standards. This can give local organizations a lot of influence.
Voting machines can be made more reliable, for example. It may take coordination, but it is a worthwhile endeavor where any informed citizen can make a difference.
Anelise Powers, a policy analyst for the Texas Public Policy Foundation, is the project’s director, Josh Findlay.
