Kamala Harris was persuaded that she would select a “moderate” state Democrat as her “moderate” fight Democrat” who would help her win 270 political seats. She did n’t do that. She chose Tim Walz, a radical leftist government from a position. While this decision had several scratching their heads, the conventional wisdom from the Democratic Party is that with Walz as her running partner, it will substantially increase the card’s charm in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.  ,
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According to MSNBC’s national political correspondent Steve Kornacki,” One of the Democrats ‘ biggest challenges in those states is in blue-collar and small-town areas,” where the party once ran competitively ( or at least respectably ) before the floor fell out. Walz’s history and style are likely to appeal to some of those voters, at least partially due to the GOP’s new dominance, according to the theory.
The problem with this theory, Kornacki points out, is that Walz “was n’t able to do that himself in his last campaign”.
The idea was that Minnesota stock statistical connections with Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. The one thing that makes Minnesota a violet position and not a fight is that “it has a higher share of the college-educated, Democratic-friendly demographic”.
Walz won his 2022 re-election bid 52%-44 % over his Republican foe. That’s basically the same as the 52%-45 % ratio Joe Biden carried the condition by in 2020.
Walz put up those figures in a worse time for Democrats, to be sure. But did he receive that 52 % with a different alliance than Biden’s, one that favors the educated Twin Cities area and has more support in the smaller towns and cities of Greater Minnesota? If he did, it would support the idea that he has a solid and special relation to the voter-trapping type Democrats have been shedding in those three crucial battleground state.
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County-level findings show that 49 of Minnesota’s 87 regions, mostly remote and pale, surged for Trump, with Democrats improving by at least 20 items in 2016 and 2020 compared to 2012. These regions, where 72%-85 % of adults have four-year levels, resemble locations in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania where Democrats have lost considerable surface.  ,
These counties were in competition before Trump, with some voters supporting Obama in 2012. And if Walz could appeal in these areas, it could boost the ticket, but as Kornacki notes,” There’s no obvious difference between Walz’s strength in those areas and what Biden showed in 2020″.
In “blue surge” counties or “places in the state where Democrats performed better in 2020 under Biden than they did in 2012 under Obama,” Walz also performed no better than Biden.
What’s striking, if anything, is how different the Walz and Biden numbers are from Obama’s. When Obama won his two elections, he joined strong metro-area support with respectable showings ( and sometimes better ) among small-town and blue-collar voters. Since Obama, the Democratic coalition’s apparent disappearance of that kind of demographic and geographic balance has been its mainstay.  ,
In his ‘ 22 campaign, Walz did n’t restore that old balance. His coalition, instead, looked just like what has become the standard post-Obama coalition for Democrats. He racked up sizable profits in major cities and was brutal almost everywhere else.  ,
None of this is to say the Harris-Walz ticket wo n’t be able to win Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan. It very well may. However, Walz will need to break through Trump-era polarization in the states where he was n’t able to do it in 2022 to increase the ticket in those states beyond what has become the Democratic Party norm.
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In other words, Walz’s primary motivation was a mirage, supporting the Democrats ‘ victory in the blue wall. Oops.
