Next Monday, I published” D. C. Federal Judges Join the Resistance”. It focused on one D. C. national district judge, Beryl Howell, who let her emotions get the better of any reasonable legitimate judgment when she refused to adopt the president’s direction to the attorney general to reject all pending charges against Jan. 6 accused  ,” with hatred”.
In a wholly gratuitous screed about why the prosecutions were necessary and appropriate, she first vented her spleen against the defendants and President Donald Trump ( who she claimed was to blame for perpetuating a “revisionist myth ) against the defendants. She finally came to the conclusion that she had no legal authority to decline to dismiss the case. But she refrained from dismissing the circumstance without prejudice in order to present the president who was the boss. That made the possibility of a similar charge being refiling possible. It was, of course, entirely contrary to the leader and DOJ’s apparent purpose.
In that same content, I pointed out that Judge Howell had business. Additionally, three of her rebellious coworkers in the D.C. district court declined to reject pending J6 situations with discrimination, including one ambiguous view from anti-Trump Judge Tanya Chutkan.
The President’s Proclamation
The leader entered his , .whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/granting-pardons-and-commutation-of-sentences-for-certain-offenses-relating-to-the-events-at-or-near-the-united-states-capitol-on-january-6-2021/” target=”_blank” rel=”noreferrer noopener”>proclamation , on Inauguration .substack.com/p/dc-federal-judges-join-the-resistance”>Day. I describe it more fully in” .substack.com/p/dc-federal-judges-join-the-resistance”>D. C. Federal Judges Join the Resistance”, but for present purposes, it is important to note that it pardoned persons who had been” convicted , of , offenses related to events that occurred at or near the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021″ (emphasis added ).
Plaintiffs who had not yet been found guilty did not receive a reprimand. The president also instructed the attorney general to “forget about” the termination of all pending charges against individuals for their actions in relation to the events that occurred on January 6, 2021, according to the president. The attorney general followed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48 ( a ) by ordering the Department of Justice to request dismissals of the pending indictments” with prejudice.”
Judge Tanya Chutkan
Tanya Chutkan might be the worst of the number. She , has a reputation for unduly severe sentences , for J6 accused, also imprisoning accused for whom the prosecution had recommended no captivity. She has presided over a number of Trump-related situations. And,  , as Sen. Ted Cruz put it, she has a “reputation for being much left, perhaps by D. C. District Court requirements” and “is going to be persistently hostile to Donald Trump”.
However, Chutkan’s unsuitability to handle difficult cases involving the Trump presidency is highlighted by her most recent, incoherent ruling, which refused to reject charges against a J6 defendant without prejudice. Although she does know how to throw in a lurid tagline that will surely garner media attention, that ruling demonstrates a lack of scientific capacity that renders her incapable of comprehending fundamental constitutional ideas.
The circumstance before Judge Chutkan was  , United States v. Banuelos. The respondent was never detained until March 2024 for J6-related crimes. By the time of Trump’s inauguration 10 weeks afterward, he had not been tried or convicted. Apparently, he had a prosecution “tentatively scheduled” in February 2025. John Banuelos therefore fell under the umbrella of those unproven, nonconviction defendants for whom the leader had instructed the attorney general to “forget to seek dismissal with prejudice.” The DOJ prosecutors complied by promptly moving for a dismissal of his indictment, with prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule 48 ( a ).
Judge Chutkan’s Buy
On that movement, Judge Chutkan issued a ruling on January 22. She refused to accept bigotry when she dismissed the allegations brought against Banuelos. Her , order , is a mixture of distress, defiance, and academic incoherence.
Second, Chutkan appeared to be unaware of the basics of the legal issue before her. She was unable to comprehend the distinction between a DOJ request to dismiss a Rule 48 ( a ) dismissal and a presidential pardon. She started the discussion with this stone:
The Government’s even mentioned reason for pursuing departure with discrimination is that the President,  , in addition to pardoning the Defendant,  , has ordered the Attorney General to do so.
No, Your Honor, no! In that single word, there are numerous errors. I’ll concentrate on only two.
Second, the president did , not , forgive Banuelos. The distinct language of the , declaration, which Chutkan cites in her , purchase, offers pardons to” all another individuals , convicted of offenses , related to events that occurred at or near the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021″. The president rather instructed the attorney general to “pursue departure with prejudice to the authorities of all waiting indictments” for defendants who had not been found guilty. And that is exactly what the DOJ did when it moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice in a Rule 48 ( a ) motion.
So, because Banuelos had not been convicted, the political forgive did not extend to him. Chutkan’s contradictory summary is unfathomable.
It is useful to note here that a pardon and a Rule 48 ( a ) dismissal of an indictment with prejudice are  , not , functionally the same thing. A pardon , does not clean or remove a fugitive faith. It does not remove the patient’s criminal records. If a prospective employer after inquires about a reprimand recipient’s history of being found guilty of a crime, he would be required to answer in the affirmative. If he had paid a good to the U. S. Treasury as part of his sentence, a pardon , do not provide him the right to have the money refunded.  ,
In contrast, a respondent who has never been convicted of a crime is always fined for the act and has never had a criminal conviction ( at least for the acts that have been dismissed ) when an accusation is dismissed. So a Rule 48 ( a ) dismissal is not the equivalent of a pardon, and confusing the two is a mistake of substance.
That one phrase contains a minute problem that leads to another legal problem. Additionally, it demonstrates the philosophical ambiguity in her placement. Chutkan’s mistaken belief that the president pardoned Banuelos (” the President, in addition to , pardoning the Defendant …”. ) is completely incompatible with her unwillingness to “turn the situation around with discrimination.” A pardon may stop cases from being filed afterwards. But Chutkan entered just a termination “without , intolerance”. The costs are also hanging over the prosecutor’s head and can be refiled. The contradiction between this and Chutkan’s theory that Banuelos was pardoned is illogical, if not for a desire to deceive either the president or the defendant ( or both ).
More issues and confusion in the order
No content with many failures in one word, the same phrase of Judge Chutkan ‘s , order , contains another legal problem. She argued that the president’s pardon “does not necessarily render a defendant’innocent’ of any alleged violation of the law.” Sorry, Judge, but Banuelos , is , a legally innocent man. You were taught in law school that all defendants are presumed innocent in our system of justice. They are not deemed guilty until a guilty verdict has been issued. Despite your implication to the contrary, that principle still holds up as the rule of the land in your court today.
Chutkan might be trying to make the case that the alleged pardon did not imply that Banuelos did not carry out the crimes against which he was accused and that his moral character was not “innocent.” That may be true, but it is not her responsibility as a judge to make any comments on it, aside from the fact that this is not what she said. Judges are expected to use legal language in their opinions and rulings to convey legal ideas, and the presumption of innocence is one of the most prevalent. Chutkan also disregarded that rule.
Judge Chutkan covered this defendant with all the crimes of any kind that all J6 actors have committed in the final paragraph of her discussion. She said,” More broadly, no pardon can change the tragic truth of what happened on January 6, 2021″. There we go with the “pardon” language again. She then continued:
The dismissal of this case cannot undo the “rampage]that ] left multiple people dead, injured more than 140 people, and inflicted millions of dollars in damage”.
This inflammatory language is detestable of a district judge in the United States. How many “multiple people” did the “rampage” supposedly leave dead?  , Four people died that day.  , All were Trump supporters. Of these four, only one was killed. Ashli Babbitt, an unarmed Air Force veteran, was shot to death by a Capitol Police officer. The other three died from medical emergencies, including heart-related conditions and one accidental drug overdose.
Further, in a blatant piece of propaganda, the Capitol Police released a statement blaming the “rioters” for the death of Officer Brian D. Sicknick. According to a report from the Capitol Police on January 8, 2021, Officer Sicknick “was injured while physically engaging with the rioters and collapsed after returning to his division office.” According to legend, he was “taken to a local hospital where he succumbed to his injuries,” with those fatal injuries being “due to injuries sustained while on duty.” It was all a lie. On January 7, Officer Sicknick passed away from a stroke, and it was determined that he had died naturally.
Chutkan’s statement that the Jan. 6 “rampage” left “multiple people dead” perpetuates these lies. She obviously intended to imply that the “rioters” caused these “multiple” deaths. Chutkan either tried to deceive herself or was simply ignorant of the facts she was stating. Sloppy or corrupt, take your pick.
Chutkan then came to the conclusion that dismissing the case” cannot whitewash the blood, feces, and terror that the mob left in its wake.” Banuelos, did you play any part in that? Judge Chutkan would have said that without a doubt. But she did not. She merely borrowed that snippet from a different case to smear him. And if you dig down , in the case she cited to identify the ultimate source for the quote, you will see it is none other than , The New York Times.
As Chutkan surely knew and likely intended, the “blood, feces, and terror” snippet became a media favorite.  , See, for example,  , The Hill,  , MSN,  , CNN,  , CBS, and others.
A Contrast and Judicial Restraint in , United States v. Box
The judicious behavior of Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly in United States v. Box stands in stark contrast to Judge Chutkan’s and some of her other rebellious colleagues ‘ inflammatory behavior. The defendant, Dominic Box, had been found guilty of” Parading, Demonstrating, or Picketing in a Capitol Building”, and similar charges after a trial in June 2024. However, as of January 20, 2025, there was no final conviction order issued because Box was not scheduled to be sentenced until February 21.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly turned to the appropriateness of the requested dismissal with prejudice in light of the defendant’s established guilt and all that had transpired at the Capitol after conducting a thorough analysis of the suitability of entering a Rule 48 ( a ) dismissal in these circumstances. She disposed of that in three sentences:
The Government’s only stated justification for pursuing dismissal with prejudice is that the President has given the Attorney General’s consent to do so. The Court cannot identify any anomalies in either the legal merits of the Government’s case or the factual justification for it that would necessitate dismissal. The Court shall not be required to provide further explanations because it acknowledges that” the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to pursue a case.”  , See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 693 ( 1974 ).  , ( internal citation omitted )
She then dismissed the case , with prejudice.
The president’s authority was absolute, so no “further explanation” was required or appropriate. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s colleagues on the bench could learn from her.
What Now?
Following the publication of” D. C. Federal Judges Join the Resistance”, I have seen a number of comments suggesting various remedies, the most humane of which were complaints to the D. C. Bar or impeachment. As a practical matter, success with the former is unlikely. As for impeachment, it would be quite time-consuming, and Congress has bigger fish to fry.
However, I do have a small suggestion that the DOJ ought to take into account.
The Democrats ‘ and their allies have made it abundantly clear that they will continue to use force. They are going to file suits nationwide in cherry-picked venues to try to thwart the administration’s entire agenda. Executive orders, laws passed by Congress, agency actions, employee terminations, attacks on fraud waste and mismanagement — everything this administration tries to do will be litigated. Many of these suits will be filed in Washington, D. C., where some will be assigned to Judge Chutkan. On the grounds that Chutkan has shown such a bias against it that she should not be allowed to hear any other cases involving the administration, DOJ should pull out all the stops and make a persistent effort to disqualify her from any cases involving the administration.
In my opinion, Chutkan’s bias is evident in the approach and language in her  and order , as well as in the simple fact that she turned down what should have been a routine request to dismiss these prosecutions with prejudice as DOJ had suggested. DOJ may reasoned that Judge Howell and perhaps other judges should also be disqualified based on the same logic. I defer to it.
This is an envelope worth pushing. DOJ should keep the pressure on and file an appeal, including to the Supreme Court, when Judge Chutkan, as one might expect, refuses to recuse herself.
This article was originally published on the author’s Substack,” Bravo Blue”, and has been lightly edited.
Former federal court judge John A. Lucas has tried and argued a number of cases, including those before the US Supreme Court. He served in the Army Special Forces as an enlisted man before going to law school at the University of Texas. He later received his degree from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1969. He served as the leader of the infantry platoon in Vietnam and is an Army Ranger. He is married with five children. He and his wife now live in Virginia. John also is published at johnalucas6. substack .com.
